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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : World Bank, Energy and Water Department, Water Sanitation Unit, and Latin America and the Caribbean Region, Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure Sector Unit
    UID:
    b3kat_BV040617339
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource
    Edition: Online-Ausgabe World Bank E-Library Archive Sonstige Standardnummer des Gesamttitels: 041181-4
    Edition: Also available in print.
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 2703
    Content: Policymakers wishing to introduce wholesale competition into the electricity industry must often reconcile existing independent power producer contracts with new market structures and trading arrangements. For the new market arrangements to bring the benefits of competition to consumers, enough participants must be willing to take market risk. A combination of measures (adaptation of specific market rule, contractual alternatives for enhancing market liquidity, contract buyout provisions, transitional mechanisms) offer promise for reconciling existing contracts with new market structures and reducing the magnitude of above-market costs associated with the contracts
    Note: "November 2001. - Title from title screen as viewed on Aug. 24, 2002 , Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[2001]
    Additional Edition: Reproduktion von Woolf, Fiona Integrating independent power producers into emerging wholesale power markets 2001
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 2
    UID:
    b3kat_BV040615225
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (xv, 88 p) , 26 cm
    Edition: Online-Ausgabe World Bank E-Library Archive Sonstige Standardnummer des Gesamttitels: 041181-4
    ISBN: 0821355929
    Series Statement: World Bank working paper no.14
    Note: Includes bibliographical references (p. 85-88) , Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:c2003
    Additional Edition: Reproduktion von Bakovic, Tonci Regulation by contract 2003
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 3
    UID:
    b3kat_BV040614710
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (1 online resource (100 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausgabe World Bank E-Library Archive Sonstige Standardnummer des Gesamttitels: 041181-4
    ISBN: 0821340417 , 9780821340417
    Series Statement: World Bank Technical Papers
    Content: This paper compares and contrasts the governance and regulation of power pools in England and Wales, Victoria (Australia), Alberta (Canada), and Scandinavia (Norway and Sweden). Governance is the process by which decisions get made, implemented and enforced--it is internal to the pools. In contrast, regulation is how governments review and change the decisions of pools--it is external to the pools. The pools are organized markets for trading in electricity commodities and services. These "new style" power pools are created to maximize competition in generation, to compete on price, and to open to all market participants. Section I describes four basic models of power pool governance and the implementation issues associated with each model. Section II gives an overview of the similarities and differences among the four pools and how they affect governance. Section III examines how each pool has dealt with a number of basic governance decision. Section IV looks at how the pools monitor the markets that they have created. Section V describes different ways in which regulators and other government institutions control pools and how this control is exercised. Section VI presents some conclusions and observations
    Additional Edition: Reproduktion von Barker, James, Jr Governance and regulation of power pools and system operators 1997
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : World Bank, Energy and Water Department, Water Sanitation Unit, and Latin America and the Caribbean Region, Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure Sector Unit
    UID:
    b3kat_BV049075891
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource
    Edition: Online-Ausg Also available in print
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 2703
    Content: Policymakers wishing to introduce wholesale competition into the electricity industry must often reconcile existing independent power producer contracts with new market structures and trading arrangements. For the new market arrangements to bring the benefits of competition to consumers, enough participants must be willing to take market risk. A combination of measures (adaptation of specific market rule, contractual alternatives for enhancing market liquidity, contract buyout provisions, transitional mechanisms) offer promise for reconciling existing contracts with new market structures and reducing the magnitude of above-market costs associated with the contracts
    Note: "November 2001 , Title from title screen as viewed on Aug. 24, 2002
    Additional Edition: Woolf, Fiona Integrating independent power producers into emerging wholesale power markets
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 5
    UID:
    gbv_884573982
    Format: 251 Seiten , Illustrationen , 24 cm
    ISBN: 9781905783854
    Note: Includes bibliographical references
    Language: English
    Subjects: Economics
    RVK:
    Keywords: Energierecht ; Energiewirtschaft
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  • 6
    UID:
    gbv_370451392
    Format: XV, 88 S
    Edition: 1. print.
    ISBN: 0821355937 , 0821355929
    Series Statement: World Bank working paper 14
    Note: Includes bibliographical references
    Language: English
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  • 7
    UID:
    gbv_293059292
    Format: XVII, 80 S.
    Edition: 1. print
    ISBN: 0821340417
    Series Statement: World Bank technical paper 382
    Language: English
    Keywords: Graue Literatur ; Fallstudie
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  • 8
    UID:
    gbv_1759671789
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: Policy Research Working Paper No. 2703
    Content: Many developing and industrial countries have sought to open their electricity industries to competition. In both contexts, policymakers and investors have to deal with the consequences of earlier, more partial sector liberalization measures. Foremost among these is the existence of long-term contracts with independent power producers (IPPs). The long-term nature of these contracts has complicated the introduction of more far-reaching sectoral reform designed to harness competitive market forces for the benefit of consumers. In developing countries, introducing competition is often coupled with breaking up and privatizing state-owned electricity monopolies. In this context, discussion of renegotiation of power purchase agreements has tended toward the polemical. At one end are those who resist any change, arguing that the "sanctity of contracts" precludes modification of contract terms. At the other end are those who favor governments taking coercive measures to modify existing contracts in the name of maximizing economic welfare and minimizing the burden of sector reform on consumers and on the state. Drawing on recent country experiences, the authors analyze alternative approaches to restructuring contracts and designing power markets to reduce rigidities and incentivize IPPs to participate more fully in wholesale power markets and to take on greater market risk. The authors conclude that forced market integration or forced contract negotiation have failed and are counterproductive. Conversely, in countries where IPPs provide a sizable proportion of generation capacity, ignoring market integration may result in insufficient market liquidity and discourage new entry, attenuating the scope for market forces to act for the benefit of consumers. Failure to adapt power purchase contracts and market rules imposes huge resource costs on the economy beyond the financial obligations consumers and taxpayers must bear. Based on recent experience, a combination of measures, including adaptation of specific market rules, contractual alternatives for enhancing market liquidity, contract buyout provisions, transitional financing mechanisms, and characteristics of the successor entity to the power purchaser, offer promising approaches for reconciling preexisting IPP contracts with new market structures and reducing the magnitude of above-market costs associated with such contracts
    Note: English , en_US
    Language: Undetermined
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  • 9
    Book
    Book
    Tulsa, Okla. : PennWell Corp.
    UID:
    gbv_355965305
    Format: XX, 700 S , graph. Darst , 24 cm
    ISBN: 0878148620
    Note: Includes bibliographical references and index , Satisfying a hungerThe basic principles -- The store cupboard, the cooks, and the oven -- The key ingredients of market design and transmission pricing -- Raising agents: capturing the benefits of market forces -- The setting agent I: approaches to regulation -- The setting agent II: performance-based, incentive regulation -- Preparation: standards and planning coordination -- Timing: obtaining the permits and rights-of-way -- Presentation (listening to stakeholders). , Satisfying a hunger -- The basic principles -- The store cupboard, the cooks, and the oven -- The key ingredients of market design and transmission pricing -- Raising agents: capturing the benefits of market forces -- The setting agent I: approaches to regulation -- The setting agent II: performance-based, incentive regulation -- Preparation: standards and planning coordination -- Timing: obtaining the permits and rights-of-way -- Presentation (listening to stakeholders)
    Language: English
    Keywords: Elektrizitätswirtschaft ; Strompreis ; Energieweltmarkt ; Glossar enthalten
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  • 10
    UID:
    gbv_797856587
    Format: Online-Ressource
    ISBN: 0821355929
    Series Statement: World Bank Working Paper 14
    Content: In with the performance of recently privatized electricity distribution companies. Governments complain that tariffs have increased without visible improvements in service. Investors contend that they have not earned reasonable returns on their investments. Both sides often express dissatisfaction with the new independent regulatory commissions established at the time of privatization. In particular, investors argue that the commissions have not lived up to their commitments and almost always side with consumer interests. Some investors claim that the design of the new regulatory system in many developing and transition economies is fundamentally flawed. They often recommend that independent regulatory commissions be supplemented or replaced by more explicit "regulation by contract." This paper examines whether regulation by contract or a combination of regulation by contract and regulatory independence would provide a better regulatory system for developing countries that wish to privatize some or all of their distribution systems. The paper: Describes the key characteristics of regulation by contract as it has been implemented in several developing countries Focuses on how regulatory contracts in several countries handle certain key issues (pass-through of power-purchase costs, foreign exchange fluctuations, loss reduction and the obligation to serve) Describes the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches for dealing with disputes that inevitably arise in the application of regulatory contracts Compares and contrasts some recent experiences of distribution entities in Latin America and India. Examines some of Brazil's recent problems that may have arisen because Brazil adopted a flawed variant of regulation by contract. The paper concludes with a discussion of some lessons that can be learned from the experience of several countries.
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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