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    UID:
    (DE-627)1820667162
    Format: 1 online resource (xiii, 612 pages) , Illustrationen
    ISBN: 9783662479049
    Series Statement: Springer Texts in Business and Economics
    Content: Intro -- Foreword by Matthew O. Jackson and Yoav Shoham -- Preface by the Editor -- Contents -- Contributors -- Chapter 1 Playing, Voting, and Dividing -- 1.1 Playing -- 1.1.1 Noncooperative Game Theory -- 1.1.2 Cooperative Game Theory -- 1.2 Voting -- 1.2.1 Preference Aggregation by Voting -- 1.2.2 Manipulative Actions in Single-Peaked Societies -- 1.2.3 Judgment Aggregation -- 1.3 Dividing -- 1.3.1 Cake-cutting: Fair Division of Divisible Goods -- 1.3.2 Fair Division of Indivisible Goods -- 1.3.3 A Brief Digression to Single-Item Auctions -- 1.3.3.1 Classification -- 1.3.3.2 English Auction -- 1.3.3.3 Dutch Auction -- 1.3.3.4 Vickrey Auction -- 1.3.3.5 American Auction -- 1.3.3.6 Expected Revenue -- 1.4 Some Literature Pointers -- 1.5 A Brief Digression to Computational Complexity -- 1.5.1 Some Foundations of Complexity Theory -- 1.5.1.1 Turing Machines and Complexity Measures -- 1.5.1.2 The Complexity Classes P and NP -- 1.5.1.3 Upper and Lower Bounds -- 1.5.2 The Satisfiability Problem of Propositional Logic -- 1.5.2.1 Definitions -- 1.5.2.2 Upper Bounds for SAT -- 1.5.2.3 How to Prove Lower Bounds: Reducibility and Hardness -- 1.5.2.4 Some Background on Approximation Theory -- 1.5.3 A Brief Compendium of Complexity Classes -- 1.5.3.1 Polynomial Space -- 1.5.3.2 The Polynomial Hierarchy -- 1.5.3.3 DP: the Second Level of the Boolean Hierarchy over NP -- 1.5.3.4 Probabilistic Polynomial Time -- Overview -- 1.5.3.5 And Now, Finally, . . . -- Part I Playing Successfully -- Chapter 2 Noncooperative Game Theory -- 2.1 Foundations -- 2.1.1 Normal Form, Dominant Strategies, and Equilibria -- 2.1.1.1 The Prisoners' Dilemma -- 2.1.1.2 Noncooperative Games in Normal Form -- 2.1.1.3 Dominant Strategies -- 2.1.1.4 Nash Equilibria in Pure Strategies -- 2.1.1.5 Relations between Solution Concepts -- 2.1.2 Further Two-Player Games.
    Note: Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 551-580
    Additional Edition: 9783662479032
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Economics and computation Heidelberg [u.a.] : Springer, 2016 3662479036
    Additional Edition: 9783662479032
    Language: English
    Subjects: Computer Science , Economics
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    Keywords: Spieltheorie ; Public-Choice-Theorie ; Verteilungstheorie ; Mathematisches Modell ; Computersimulation
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